By Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann (auth.), Prof. Dr. Günter Bamberg, Prof. Dr. Klaus Spremann (eds.)
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Extra resources for Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives
Agency and the Market. Chapter 23, Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. J. D. INTRILLIGATOR, North-Holland 1986, 1183-1200. ALCHIAN, ARMEN A. and HAROLD DEMSETZ: Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization. American Economic Review 62 (1972) 5, 777-795. BAMBERG, GUNTER and KLAUS SPREMANN: Implications of Constant Risk Aversion. Zeitschrift fur Operations Research 25 (1981), 205-224. BAMBERG, GUNTER and KLAUS SPREMANN: Risikopramien und Informationswerte bei lokaler Konsistenz.
G The agent's function is given by = ail + F - A a2 0 2/2, ( 11) with Ga GF il - A =+ 1, 0 2 a <:> GFF 0, = GF G aa = 0', - A a-2 < 0, 46 the principal's function is given by (12) with HF =- 1, HFF = HFa = O. We proceed by analyzing the preference maps of a representative principal and an agent. Starting with the agent's situation we can derive following proposition: convex with a following dF da I G=- and show the In an a - F space the agent's indifference unique turning point (minimum) at Ga = O.
Consequently, there are three reasons why the introduction of monitoring signals can be costly. One of course is that the technology of monitoring requires resources. The second reason is that the agent asks for new negotiations on the level m of his welfare. The third reason is that a disutility caused by monitoring must be compensated. 6 Screening So far, the principal has been assumed to know all the agent's characteristics such as risk aversion and so forth. 5 focussed on hidden effort and monitoring.